Cognitive Illusions of Authorship Reveal Hierarchical Error Detection in Skilled Typists
Touchy Typing
Even the most able typist makes errors, and Logan and Crump (p. 683) have used this real-world task to probe for the existence of two error-detection mechanisms. They inserted errors into words that had been typed correctly by the subjects, and they corrected errors that had been made. By measuring implicit error detection as the slowing of movement just after an error had been committed and by eliciting explicit monitoring of errors by the output shown on the screen, they uncovered a double dissociation. Inserted errors did not lengthen the interval until the next letter was typed, but they were reported by the typist as errors; on the other hand, corrected errors did increase the interval, but were nevertheless claimed by the subjects as having been typed correctly.
Abstract
The ability to detect errors is an essential component of cognitive control. Studies of error detection in humans typically use simple tasks and propose single-process theories of detection. We examined error detection by skilled typists and found illusions of authorship that provide evidence for two error-detection processes. We corrected errors that typists made and inserted errors in correct responses. When asked to report errors, typists took credit for corrected errors and accepted blame for inserted errors, claiming authorship for the appearance of the screen. However, their typing rate showed no evidence of these illusions, slowing down after corrected errors but not after inserted errors. This dissociation suggests two error-detection processes: one sensitive to the appearance of the screen and the other sensitive to keystrokes.
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Information & Authors
Information
Published In
Science
Volume 330 • Issue 6004 • 29 October 2010
Pages: 683 - 686
History
Received: 5 April 2010
Accepted: 13 September 2010
Copyright
Copyright © 2010, American Association for the Advancement of Science.
Conscious Error Detection Is Unnecessary for Post-Error Adjustments
By inserting errors on correct responses and automatically correcting some errors unbeknownst to typists during typewriting, G. D. Logan and M. J. C. Crump ("Cognitive illusions of authorship reveal hierarchical error detection in skilled typists," Reports, 29 October 2010, p. 683) showed that post-error slowing (PES) and conscious error perception may dissociate. The results are interpreted in a specific theoretical framework of typewriting skills suggesting that "inner" error detection relies on proprioception and elicits PES, while "outer" error detection depends on visual feedback and leads to conscious awareness of having failed. Here, we present neurobiologically informed explanations of their findings that, at a more general level, highlight the relative independence of error-driven behavioral adaptation from post hoc conscious interpretations of one's accuracy.
Performance monitoring in the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) is independent of stimulus, response, and feedback modality (1-3), and of whether the failure was self-generated or externally inserted (4, 5). Monitoring-related ACC activity predicts motor and attentional adaptation and learning (6-9), suggesting a generic monitoring system evaluating goal achievement based on all available information and triggering necessary adjustments (10).
Logan and Crump's assumption that PES reflects a specific adaptation to errors has repeatedly been challenged (11, 12). The fact that all typing errors in their experiment, irrespective of conscious perception or unnoticed correction, were associated with PES can be explained either by persistence of the same problem that caused the error itself in the absence of any adaptation (8), or, more likely, by error-driven motor inhibition (12).
While ACC activity drives PES, it may be uncoupled from conscious error perception based on accumulating evidence for a mistake (13). Error blindness (authorship illusion) in the present study may result from false visual evidence overriding short-lived input from motor efference copy and proprioception.
The reliability of automatic post-error behavioral adjustments sharply contrasts with humans' easily manipulated conscious interpretations of their actions. Thus, it remains questionable whether conscious error perception is a necessary, hierarchically higher stage in the recruitment of cognitive control.
Markus Ullsperger and Claudia Danielmeier
Donders Institute for Brain, Cognition and Behaviour, Radboud University Nijmegen, Nijmegen, The Netherlands, and Max Planck Institute for Neurological Research, Cologne, Germany.
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Response to M. Ullsperger and C. Danielmeier's E-Letter
M. Ullsperger and C. Danielmeier suggest alternative explanations for the post-error slowing we observed and provide some speculations about the dissociation we observed between post-error slowing and explicit reports of error detection ("Cognitive illusions of authorship reveal hierarchical error detection in skilled typists," G. D. Logan and M. J. C. Crump, Reports, 29 October 2010, p. 683), questioning whether conscious error detection is a necessary stage in the recruitment of cognitive control. We agree that there are several interpretations of the post-error slowing (1, 2); we did not design our experiments to discriminate between them. We urge caution in generalizing explanations of post-error slowing from tasks that involve single responses to tasks like typewriting that require coordinated sequences of rapid responses. Parallel activation of keystrokes (3, 4) may undermine response conflict mechanisms (5) and control of serial order may require novel mechanisms (6, 7).
We strongly disagree with their suggestion that conscious error detection is not a necessary stage in the recruitment of cognitive control in typewriting. Conscious error detection, triggered by reading the output on the computer screen, is essential for accurate typewriting. The main goal of typewriting is to produce an external document that accurately expresses an intended message. Achieving this goal requires conscious awareness of many levels of structure in the output text, from meaning to grammar to inadvertent keystrokes. Conscious error detection recruits a variety of post error adjustments that also require conscious choice. One can backspace to the error, move the cursor to it with arrow keys, or move the cursor to it with a mouse. One can remove the error with backspaces or forward deletions. Sometimes errors of meaning and grammar require selecting and deleting whole regions of text. Correction may involve simply re-typing the word or reformulating the syntax or meaning of the sentence. These processes are part of the skill set of all typists, so it seems clear that conscious error detection and correction are necessary components of cognitive control in skilled typewriting.
The fact that typewriting is a means to an end makes it different from most laboratory tasks that are used to study error detection, in which a single keypress is an end in itself. Usually, the keypress has no visible effect on the environment [but see (8, 9)]. Nothing is echoed on the screen and no consequence of the keypress is important other than its speed and accuracy. There is little for subjects to be conscious of beyond proprioceptive and kinesthetic feedback. Usually, subjects are not allowed to correct their errors and there is little point in doing so because the external environment is the same after errors and correct responses. There is nothing for conscious processes to adjust. By contrast, typewriting has visible consequences that are more important than the speed and accuracy of single keystrokes. In the end, the screen must look right and the document must contain no errors, and conscious adjustment is required to make it so.
An important question is whether tasks that require cognitive control are more often like typewriting, which involves extended interaction with the environment and produces important effects that express complex intentions, or more often like simple keypresses, in which simple motor acts are the main point of performance. We suggest that many tasks that require cognitive control are as complex as typewriting and also require conscious control processes (such as conversing, navigating, and playing music). We do not deny that unconscious control processes are important or that cognitive control of simple tasks is interesting. We suggest that they are only part of the picture and that conscious control in complex tasks is interesting and important. Documenting the neural and computational properties of conscious and unconscious control mechanisms is an important goal for future research.
Gordon D. Logan and Matthew J. C. Crump
Department of Psychology, Vanderbilt University, Nashville, TN 37203, USA.
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Conflict of Interest:
None declared